Intelligent Design verses Evolution.

Below is the first mesage to hegel@yahoogroups.com,

It is true that I disagree with many of the policies of Mr.Bush,But
I can't see what is wrong with his reasoning of teaching both
Intelligent Design and Evolution in state educational
institutions.Surly Evolution is only a thesis.The Being moment,the
external,material vision.So is intelligent design only the anti
thesis. Essence moment,the internal reflective thought.The
idealistic vision.But in Actuality there is no opposition.The inner
is related to the outer ,there is no internal divorced from the
external.What may be the need of the hour is a synthesis.to over
come this negation of antithesis.A Negation of Negation-The Notion
is neither Evolution nor intelligent design but the one in which
these are the moments.So Surely it may make the students and hence
the mass to realize the notion of this mystery.I think these
Americans are Crazy to oppose such a brilliant idea of Bush.

lathief

Reply in hegel-dialognet@yahoogroups.com,  by  nemonemini@a..


Thanks for reposting this on the Hegel in Exile list.
 
Teaching both sides of the debate in school is a great idea in
principle, 
but in practice one side will attempt to take advantage of the
other.
I think the design argument needs a clarification, and to be made 
independent of any particular religious group. Then it can enter in
neutral  fashion
into public discourse.
The problem then is the provocative behavior of the various
conservative 
interest groups whose ambitions are more political than scientific.
 
John  Landon
nemonemini@a...
jcl99@c...

Site for
World  History
And The Eonic Effect
Second Edition
_http://history-and-evolution.com_ (http://history-and-
evolution.com/)
Darwiniana:  An Evolution Blog
_http://darwiniana.com_ (http://darwiniana.com/)
 

My reply in  hegel-dialognet@yahoogroups.com,

Hi Mr. John
>Thanks for reposting this on the Hegel in Exile list.

Sorry I was not recently following messages either in yahoo groups
or in
hegelnet.So I am in the dark about the expression 'Hegel in exile
list'.

>Teaching both sides of the debate in school is a great idea in
principle,
>but in practice one side will attempt to take advantage of the
other.
But According to Hegel what is Rational or Reason or Idea is also
Actual and
Real.In reality a perfect state is the one in which the Reason is in
total
freedom.So as long as there is no realisation of this great idea
that state
is not real state or we may say less real or illusionary state in
Hegel's
terms.Notion of a state is this free reason irrespective of whether
it is
Monarchy,Democracy or Aristocracy.There are other issues like in a
real state
you cannot see this kind of antagonism between the legislative and
the
judiciary.
Another point is whether it is rational in a democracy to deny this
basic
freedom to one section(it is immaterial that section is Evolution or
inner
Design) because of the issue of taking advantage of one party.Is not
making constitutional amendments,
the laws more strict to prevent such taking advantages rational or
free
reason than denying altogether this basic right of expressing one
point of
view.

>I think the design argument needs a clarification, and to be made
independent of any particular religious group. Then it can enter in
neutral  fashion
>into public discourse.
The problem then is the provocative behavior of the various
conservative
>interest groups whose ambitions are more political than scientific

Yes, you are right.That is why I characterized these advocates of
design today as those belongs to the Essence moment.Those people of
reflective understanding,these particular religious &various
conservative groups with hidden political interests.Hegel described
these same lot in his Encyclopedia,Science of Logic,History of
philosophy and other books as scholastics &old metaphysicians.people
who stops at the negation of antithesis.People of exclusiveness.both
these groups,materialist evolution with their only empirical science
as valid and these design metaphysicians are people of
exclusiveness ,both never going beyond this reflective
understanding ,hence never getting beyond this negation.
But as I told earlier at notional stage there is no such
opposition.There evolution is not only Being but also contain the
categories of Existence and Appearance hence Essence.Like that
design is not only essence but contain the category Telos.(Notion-
subjective notion-Objective Notion-mechanism,chemism,teleology).It
does not even stop at this moment of notion ,teleology where the end
is already fixed or a preplanned design but develops in to the
absolute notion of this mystery where there is unity of both thought
and will or the moment of thinking will.So either when we take these
categories these are the free self development of the notion or if
we take the world it is nothing but the free externalization and
manifestation of these same free absolute idea.

"This is true in still greater measure of absolute spirit which
reveals itself as the concrete and final supreme truth of all being,
and which at the end of the development is known as freely
externalizing itself, abandoning itself to the shape of an immediate
being -opening or unfolding itself [sich entschliessend] into the
creation of a world which contains all that fell into the
development which preceded that result and which through this
reversal of its position relatively to its beginning is transformed
into something dependent on the result as principle".(Science of
Logic102)

"Enjoying
however an absolute liberty, the Idea does not merely pass over into
life, or
as finite cognition allow life to show in it: in its own absolute
truth it
resolves to let the 'moment' of its particularity, or of the first
characterisation and other-being, the immediate idea, as its
reflected image,
go forth freely as Nature"(Encyclopedia-Logic-.244)
"Nature is to be viewed as a system of stages, in which one stage
necessarily arises from the other and is the truth closest to the
other from which it results, though not in such a way that the one
would naturally generate the other, but rather in the inner idea
which constitutes the ground of nature.

It has been an awkward conception in older and also more recent
philosophy of nature to see the progression and the transition of
one natural form and sphere into another as an external, actual
production which, however, in order to be made clearer, is relegated
to the darkness of the past. Precisely this externality is
characteristic of nature: differences are allowed to fall apart and
to appear as existences indifferent to each other; and the
dialectical concept, which leads the stages further, is the interior
which emerges only in the spirit"-(Encyclopedia-Philosophy of
Nature194)

lathief

 

Rrply in hegel-dialognet@yahoogroups.com, nemonemini@a.

 
 
To the hegel-dialognet list (the 'in exile' list for those unsubbed
from  the
main hegel at yahoo list)
Lathief, I am not an Hegelian. So I am not sure just what to make of
your 
suggestions. I was frustrated that I was unsubbed from the Hegel
list for 
raising the issue of evolution. I plugged that line a long
time,whenever I could 
get a post on the list, and now that the question is being taken up
on the 
list, I can no longer participate. They want to fix Hegel as a
Darwinist, I 
guess, which is outrageous. Typical. So I am in no mood for any of
it  anymore.
Hegel, to me, confuses the issue, despite my respect for his
historical  place,
and the brilliance of his failed assault on metaphysics.  Your 
feeling that
he would be in favor of ID is perfectly sensible.. But these 
academic
Hegelians, and their often crypto-Marxist buddies, would wish to 
produce a deceptive
post-theistic Hegel that conforms to their social  ambitions to not
associate
Hegel with a fundamentalist design argument. That to  me is
incredible, but if
Marx,who has my respect in general, can be a  dialectician anything
is
possible here. Even Engels on the dialectics of nature.  You are in
the middle of
Hegel/Marx schizophrenia, puzzled that Hegel has been  taken out of
your hands
by secularist Hegel fans. You may be better off! Hegel  was highly
deceptive,
and it is doubtful, even after all his tomes on the  philosophy of
religion, if
he was even a theist. So this Machiavellian  philosopher told a Big
Lie. You 
should be shocked, and be wary of these  tricksters, if you are a
sincere
religionist.
 
And the way in which people on the list wish to make Hegel
compatible with 
Darwin is, to me, disingenous. Hegel plays on  history chess  board
with two
sets of extra queens, which kinda suggests a design argument  to me.
That's not
exactly the science angle. With two extra queens you can
make  'spirit' do
everything from the French Revolution, to the mutations in 
chimpanzees.
 So I sympathize with your criticisms, but my view is different.
Again, as I said, I am not an Hegelian. I try to be fair on Hegel,
but 
distance myself from him, because of my feeling that few manage to
use him 
properly. The first and highest probability is that Hegel will
confuse you and 
terminate your philosophic career with a 'logically damaged
brain'.The remedy is  a
 'Kantian bread and water' regime, and maybe even a Zen monastery
regime. 
Schopenhauer spent his whole life denouncing Hegel for this reason,
if you 
recall.
That's unfair to Hegel, no doubt. But if you wish to do Hegel, you
need to 
proceed with caution.
Hegel's place in the evolution debate is ambiguous, as the Hegel
list 
threads make clear. I frankly find the Kantian position very closely
adapted to  the
question of Darwinism and its limits, with its unique insights into,
and 
caution, over questions of teleology.
The issue of what to do in the schools is a troubling one. A
balanced  debate
over ID and Darwinism should by rights be allowed, so why not allow
it?  The
reluctance of the current scientific community shows them in their
real 
colors, and springs from their inability to see through their own 
limitations on
evolution, but also, whatever their delusions, a healthy sense  that
the Bible
Belt and ID movement are more interested in cultural  politics and
seizing
control of secular institutions than in anything to do with 
evolution. Allowing
religionists to invade science classes would backfire. Or  maybe
not. What on
earth are they afraid of? Every student who watches TV must  be
aware of the
debate, and shouldn't have to sit through Darwin indoctrination 
with his legal
right to disagree taken away from him by the courts.
It is a huge mess, in part because neither side is acting in good
faith.
There should be no convenient exceptions to the allowance of
balanced 
viewpoints. But there are a lot of viewpoints on
evolution, 'balanced' here  means
only two power groups will have a say. A tricky form of 'mexican
standoff 
censorship' would be the result. Not balance. This isn't a fight
over truth, but 
who gets to indoctrinate kids. Noone without power backup will have
a say, or 
the propaganda funds to match.
 
In the abstract, you are right,I just can't see how discussions of
ID in a 
biology class would be all that harmful.
The recent court decision is quite ugly: now the subject can't even
be 
mentioned. For Darwinism to be so enforced by the court system is,
frankly,  going
a bit far.
I can't really solve that problem over the Internet, and the context
of 
these schools is something I may not have understood. So I would be
cautious in 
passing judgment. Part of the problem is that fundamentalist ID is
so stupidly 
mixed up with balderdash that noone could safely enjoin equal
discussion 
here without being afraid it would backfire and produce a ludicrous
pastiche of 
biological education. Still, that's not an excuse. There are fifty
ways to  do
this that are better, but noone will take the initiative, and the
job 
defaults to these creationists. You know, a short discussion of Kant
on the  design
argument, and the real history of biology could be provided in a
week's  worth
of scholarly time, to clarify these issues, but instead we have
nothing  but
a reign of silence in academia as Darwinists enforce their hegemony.
What 
happened to Kant scholars here? We could have had a book or two from
the 
scholarly community mediating the metaphysics of this debate, and
explaining the 
history of design arguments, and Kant's place there,with the history
of Hegelian 
and Marxist views on development, history, ideology, etc...
Darwinian
histories  here are misleading and need some outside mediation by
scholars in other 
fields.It might have helped! But instead, silence. Nothing. Just
regurgitated 
Darwin positivism, and garbled Popper.
 
Finally, as noted, in an amusing irony, a new book, Susskind's The 
Cosmic
Landscape unwittingly makes clear that ID, in a more intelligent
form, is  a
central topic in string theory, thus a perfectly good scientific 
question,
whatever the outcome of that debate. So the court judgment, fed to 
them by such as
the NCSE, that design questions have no scientific handle, is 
simply not the
case. The physics version of this might help here, since the 
mathematics
keeps the subject from flying off into metaphysics. Noone can get 
away with
pulling a fast one.
 
So the current Darwin environment is very artificial. Even as they
say ID  is
not science, string theorists in  current physics are directly
involved  in
debates over the Anthropic principle. ID has graduated to this more 
sophisticated, mathematically cogent, form, and the physics
community is in an  uproar. 
 
Hope this helps.

 

From: "Levi R. Bryant" <lprbryant@yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: Re: Evolution versus Intelligent Design.The Thesis & The Antithesis.

Dear Lathief,
 
  From a Hegelian perspective, at least, I think there are some  confusions in your remarks about evolution.  First, your initial  post suggests that there needs to be some sort of dialectical  reconciliation between evolutionary theory and ID; however, it's  notable that not all oppositions are reconciled in Hegel's thought.  Perhaps the prime example of this is the dialectic between the lord and  bondsman, where the bondsman goes on to discover his freedom, whereas  the lord atrophies and shrivels away.  The dialectic you present  between evolution and ID strikes me as mechanical, and doesn't  establish that evolution inherently leads to this position.  That  is, you begin with an external opposition between two terms, rather  than showing how a term produces its own other immanently as is  demanded by Hegel. 
 
  However, I think the more serious problem is the conception of  teleology you present below.  Evolutionary theory does not reject  teleology, but, like Hegel, it does reject *external* teleology.   You will find this discussion in sections 204-212 of the Shorter Logic,  where Hegel is quite clear that he does not advocate the sort of  teleology referring to a designer you're talking about. Rather, Hegel  is referring to the internal teleological structure of an entity where  the entity 1) reproduces its own parts (i.e., my body produces its  lungs, heart, blood, etc), 2) reproduces itself as a whole (i.e.,  reproduction), and 3) where it is not strictly determined by events  from the outside.  Design, here, is immanent or internal to the  entity, not externally imposed.  This is radically different than  what creationists and intelligent design theorists are claiming.   Autopoietic theory is currently working out the empirical theoriziation  of point three. 
 
  Your remark to the effect that teleogy indicates a pre-planned goal  reveals that you are thinking in terms of external teleology (e.g., the  house is built for the purpose of shelter) rather than the proper  Hegelian notion of internal teleogy (e.g. a tiger develops as it does  in order to be a tiger).  Hegel, following Kant, levels a strong  critique against external teleology (upon which ID is based).  ID  theorists sometimes suggest that evolutionary theorists are unable to  deal with teleology, and that there is an irreducible complexity, but  work currently being done in autopoietic theory and complexity theory  undermines these claims.  What both of these fields suggest is  that the dialectical sublation of ID doesn't lie in an appeal to a  *transcendent* designer (which would be contrary to Hegel's notion of  spirit anyway as Hegel's spirit is a *result* and is *immanent*), but  rather that this sublation consists in *naturalizing* the claims of ID  (where the claims I'm
 referring to are those of complexity and internal  teleology).
 
  Moreover, your opposition between the logic of being and the logic of  essence seems to miss the mark, as, for Hegel, all science deals with  reflected essence in its discovery of laws.  For instance, the  laws of gravity belong to reflection or the doctrine of essence and we  don't need to evoke any mysterious designer to employ the categories of  essence.  For Hegel, rather, reflection is *immanent* to the thing  itself.  You seem to miss this in using the categories of essence  as a counter-argument against the evolutionary theorists.  There's  no reason to suppose that the evolutionary theorist is any less able to  talk about the essence of life (in Hegel's sense of "essence") than the  physicist or chemist who discovers essence in the form of natural  laws.  You suggest that evolutionary theory's reference to chance  and randomness demonstrates that it only reflects life externally, yet  Hegel is quite clear that the realm of nature (to which discussion of  organic life
 belongs) refers to contingency (i.e., that which makes  reference to something other than itself) and emerges out of  contingency.
 
  Regarding your remarks about the state, I think it's a mistake to  confuse Hegel's claims about the state with the idea that somehow, with  the formation of the free state, everything is harmonious and  nice.  Hegel's totalities aren't totalities or systems where  everything is somehow peaceful and resolved once and for all, but are  strange totalities filled with, I think, irreducible conflict which  functions to perpetually bring them to develop further.  That is,  the state as a free state is a state where humanity has become  conscious of itself as free within the context of the state, not a  state where everything that exists necessarily exemplifies this  freedom.  Indeed, insofar as IDers continue to think of God as  transcendent rather than as the immanent spirit of the community, we  could make the claim that IDers and creationists remain unfree in their  being.  God is still understood here as a beyond or other.   The idea that an untestable, unempirical theory such as ID
 should be  taught simply because a group of people are upset about it is like  suggesting that we should teach palmestry because a group of people  have a belief that the future can be predicted by reading palms.
 
  Kind Regards,
 
  Levi
www.levibryant.com

Dear Levi,

Happy New Year!

First about Lord and slave dialctics and the reconciliation of these
opposites

One of the basic feature of Hegel's philosophy is all oppositions are
reconciled in the next higher concept.what we have to under stand is if a
category is not reconciled and as you say shrivels away it will not become a
moment in the higher category.According to Hegel the highest category The
Absolute Subject contain all the preceding categories as his predicates.Even
evil(non being,nothing),chance and contingency are reconciled in its own
stage and the only difference is some are the major categories and the
others are less important or minor categories.
without this reconciliation it is impossible for the notion or concept of
self consciousness recognitive to develop into the higher notion of
universal
self consciousness and this in to Reason..In other words you are seeing only
one side of this process ,the annihilation of  individual self consciousness
in the slave ,but if you carefully read the above you can also see the
expansion of the individual self consciousness in the lord.You are
completely missing Hegel because you are not only neglecting the transition
into each other(essential consciousness-lord- into unessential consciousness
and the unessential consciousness-slave-into lord.Secondly you are
forgetting the above expansion of individual self consciousness into
objective spirit and Absolute spirit first by property(mine)then through
family,civil society state,art etc into philosophic mind.

Here is some relevent Hegel quotes for for your reflection


433  But because life is as requisite as liberty to the solution, the
fight ends in the first instance as a one-sided negation with inequality.
While the one combatant prefers life, retains his single self-consciousness,
but surrenders his claim for recognition, the other holds fast to his
self-assertion and is recognized by the former as his superior. Thus arises
the status of master and slave.
In the battle for recognition and the subjugation under a master, we see, on
their phenomenal side, the emergence of man's social life and the
commencement of political union. Force, which is the basis of this
phenomenon, is not on that account a basis of right, but only the necessary
and legitimate factor in the passage from the state of self-consciousness
sunk in appetite and selfish isolation into the state of universal
self-consciousness. Force, then, is the external or phenomenal commencement
of states, not their underlying and essential principle(Philosophy of Mind)

435  But secondly, when we look to the distinction of the two, the master
beholds in the slave and his servitude the supremacy of his single self-hood
resulting from the suppression of immediate self-hood, a suppression,
however, which falls on another. This other, the slave, however, in the
service of the master, works off his individualist self-will, overcomes the
inner immediacy of appetite, and in this divestment of self and in 'the fear
of his lord' makes 'the beginning of wisdom' - the passage to universal
self- consciousness.(Ibid)

In all this, the unessential consciousness is, for the master, the object
which embodies the truth of his certainty of himself. But it is evident that
this object does not correspond to its notion; for, just where the master
has effectively achieved lordship, he really finds that something has come
about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an inde-
[237] endent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved. He
is thus not assured of self-existence as his truth; he finds that his truth
is rather the unessential consciousness, and the fortuitous unessential
action of that consciousness.(phenomenology)

The truth of the independent consciousness is accordingly the consciousness
of the bondsman. This doubtless appears in the first instance outside
itself, and not as the truth of self-consciousness. But just as lordship
showed its essential nature to be the reverse of what it wants to be, so,
too, bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what it
immediately is: being a consciousness repressed within itself, it will enter
into itself, and change round into real and true independence(Ibid).


secondly about I am being mechanical and my  opposition only being external.

Another fundamental feature of Hegel's philosophy is there is nothing
external to Absolute spirit or in better term both internal and external are
in Absolute Spirit.What ever be your notion of evolution or design it is
concerned with on the whole with the development of nature and mind .But as
Hegel says it is nothing but self externalization of the Absolute.

As I explained earlier as Evolution in its classical form with natural
selection and survival of the fittest(Outer or external as the cause of the
inner) and other similar concepts is from its exclusive stand belongs to
Being .similarly the design with its designer (inner as the cause of outer)
belongs to Essence in its one sidedness.Now essence is only reflected
being,being going deep into itself.So I am at a loss to comprehend your
criticism of being mechanical and external opposition.

thirdly about your serious problem of my conception of teleology as
external.

Even a little careful reading and reflection of my post would have
shown you that I am not saying about neither my conception nor Hegel,s(which
are self evident from my post and Hegel quotes) but the conception of what
Hegel calls metaphysicians and scholastics-to which you can add
current conservative religionists.As you may aware teleology is a category
which was neither coined by Hegel nor used for the first time by Hegel but
the main point of metaphysians and scholastics.It is their one sided view
and their conception of both design and an external designer .

Fourthly your inference from my pre plan and design that I am saying
about external teleology and transcendent designer.

This misunderstanding can be
only removed by a correct comprehension of Hegel,s philosophy.The nature or
reality of both your evolutionary theory and your opponents ID is what Hegel
expound in the self development of the Absolute as logical categories in
science of logic and lesser logic(except the logical form in its first
syllogism ) and its self externalization of culmination into Absolute spirit
in both philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit(Mind).As you may aware
his phenomenology,philosophy of right,philosophy of
history,religion,aesthetics and history of philosophy and all other books
are only an elaboration of his philosophy of spirit.Now what causes the
further development of the idea from teleology is even at the stage of
realised end(subjective end -means-realised end) even though the
one-sidedness of both subjectivity and objectivity is now cancelled the
realised end is only the immediate realisation of the implicit unity of
subjective and objective,not a mediated one. Due to this immediacy even
though the notion is realised in the object it is not completely manifested
in
its complete truth ,hence my expression preplanned design and not as you
thought external teleology or transcendent designer.Hence at the stage  of
teleology the Good is not accomplished but there is an ought to.This is why
it develops from teleology(objective notion) into Absolute notion or idea as
first as life and then into cognition(thought,will).even at the stage of
will there is the ought to-this you can see in lesser logic where Hegel
criticizes Kant.The consummation is only at absolute idea where thought and
will is in a unity and the subject is the thinking will,where all other
categories are only the contents or predicates of the subject which
eternally accomplishing itself

 "All unsatisfied
endeavour ceases, when we recognise that the final purpose of the world is
accomplished no less than ever accomplishing itself"

Through this process, therefore, there is made
explicitly manifest what was the notion of design: viz. the implicit unity
of
subjective and objective is non realised. And this is the Idea.
This finitude of the End consists in the circumstance, that, in the process
of
realising it, the material, which is employed as a means, is only externally
subsumed under it and made conformable to it. But, as a matter of fact, the
object is the notion implicitly: and thus when the notion, in the shape of
End, is realised in the object, Be have but the manifestation of the inner
nature of the object itself. Objectivity is thus, as it were, only a
covering
under which the notion lies concealed. Within the range of the finite we
can never see or experience that the End has been really secured. The
consummation of the infinite End, therefore, consists merely in removing
the illusion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. The Good, the
absolutely Good, is eternally accomplishing itself in the world: and the
result is that it need not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as
well
as in full actuality, accomplished.-lesser logic-211

Now your fifth remark about my missing the mark between being and essence.

I may be missing the mark but can't you see you are missing the whole Hegel.

 "as, for Hegel, all science deals with reflected essence"
This is a basic error.Essence is reflected Being.There is no such a notion
of reflected Essence in Hegel.Reflection Itself  is this Essence.All the
categories
of Essence like major ones Ground of Existence ,Appearance,and Actuality are
nothing but the categories of reflected being.So in reality there no rigid
opposition in my case between being and essence.As the essence is reflected
being it is reconciled in my notion.

Yes reflection is immanent in being.But like all dialectical materialists
you are putting Hegel upside down.It is true that in the beginning when we
proceed with being it looks like essence is only implicit in being but when
we get at Essence we will have the realization or in Hegel terms speculative
knowledge of essence is really the prior and we get to notion we will
further realize that notion is the first ,where we can have the knowledge of
the result becoming the absolute Ground.So nether Being nor essence is the
Absolute Ground.So after all what you call matter is only a form of thought.
and not the reverse that thought is a form of matter.Let us make Hegel
straight(about this I will explain more in my next post of 'logic and its
three syllogical forms).
so gravity is a thought of physical form(see philosophy of
nature=Matter).And it is thought of a Thinker ,the absolute Subject.This
designer is immanent in his thoughts but as a subject or ego he can abstract
or negate all this from his pure subjectivity.

Your expression 'essence of life'

Really Hegelians will have a belly laugh hearing your expressions like
"reflected essence" and "essence of life".Again you are missing the whole
Hegel.The basic thing to
understand is Hegel ,s notion or idea or concept or comprehension of Essence
and Life  will not produce the expression 'essence of life'. Essence is an
inferior category .Life is Notion itself in its immediacy. So it is the real
prior when compared with essence or being.
the same with your idea of contingency. contingency is only a minor category
of essence coming under the major category of Actuality.
It may be your
Dialectical materialism or the stage you reached which prompts you to say
life
is developing out of contingency.Even when you get the stage of Life you
will have the speculative idea that what is the result as Life is the ground
of the preceding categories and when you reach Absolute idea you will have
the idea that this Absolute idea is the real and Absolute Ground.
So like Dialectical materialism this evolutionary theory is also putting
Hegel upside down.
I think you are trying to reach that primordial soup and Dawkin's monkey
knocking on the keyboard vision by this argument of life developing from
contingency.Alas-you miss the whole Hegel and trying again to put him upside
down.It is the self development of the notion and this notion and life are
the ground with speculative knowledge.

Now your remarks about state and comparison of ID's with Palmists.

As I explained above like dialectical materialists evolutionists also Matter
is the Ground even though mind is immanent in this matter.So unlike Hegel
for
you Idea is not the absolute prior or ground or in other words your
proposition is not like Hegel's Being is implicit Notion but Notion is
implicit Being.For you being or matter is the absolute ground.So as I told
earlier with these more categories of being (even though with the categories
of mechanism there is some objective notion) is not the other 1D better than
theses evolutionists .Further there is even this objective notion of
teleology which however these metaphysicians with their reflective
understanding turned into a designer and design.Any way is not palmistry
which is connected with immediate life some thing better than mere teaching
of evolution which looks like teaching crystal gazing with this dry life
less dialectical materialism.

Your definition of science as testable and empirical one.

Hegel has long back
stated as a reply that what ever is in consciousness is experienced and I
still think
his method of developing the notion from itself is the best scientific
method than your empiricism.

Now about the state .

let us leave Hegel,any way I am not a Hegelian eventhogh
I agree with some of his ideas.My basic difference with Hegel is to me the
beginning is not being,notion implicit but notion explicit.(I already have
some interesting discussion about this with Hegelians like Mr.Mike Marchetti
and Paul Trejo and I intent to post soon an article  "Logic and its three
syllogistic forms")
So let us leave Hegel and come to the basic issue.You may agree that the
idea of the perfect state implies grater and greater freedom.The basic of
this freedom is the freedom of expression.When we deny this freedom to one
group how you think we can over come your "irreducible conflicts " yet
further development of this free state.so after all these conflicts
are not irreducible but they can be or must be resolved and reconciled for
the further development of perfect free state.Now how is possible for the
humanity you speak of in this state "become conscious of itself as free
within the context of the state" when what makes them becoming conscious of
freedom-the freedom of expression is denied to them.Again for the existence
of this free state is not it necessary that this opposition between the
legislative and judiciary must be resolved.
lastly who the hell those people think they are who think they have the
rights and freedom to deny these rights to the opposite group of expression
and teaching while they unilaterally enjoy these rights.Is not your
evolutionists denying other group the freedom to teach and express a
transcendent god are instead playing God themselves .Have
they not yet learned anything from a similar audacity of a God man called
Stalin.

Your trying to reinforce evolution with systems and complexity theory and
autopoiesis I will deal in another post.
kind regards
lathief
 

--- In hegel@yahoogroups.com, "Levi R. Bryant" <lprbryant@y...>
wrote:
>
> Dear Lathief,
>  
>   You've written a great deal here, much of which appears to be a
sort of  word salad, so I'll content myself with only making a few 
remarks.  First, I continue to see the lord/bondsman dialectic as 
an intance where we do not have a reconciliation as you suggest.  
The reason for this is very simple, in the Phenomenology it is the 
slave that continues to develop, not the master, as it is the slave 
that 1) discovers his freedom to mould the world, and 2) discovers
his  interiority through his encounter with the possibility of
death.   The mistake you are making is to conceive dialectic
mechanically as an  opposition between two terms that are already
present-at-hand, rather  than as a movement whereby one term
generates its own other.  For  instance, in the opening move of the
Logic we do not first have being  and nothing, rather we have being
intrinsically or necessarily leading  to the concept of nothing. 
This point is important, I think,  because we can't begin with the
>  premise that there are two terms--  evolution and ID --that then
reconcile themselves, but dialectically  must show that ID
necessarily or notionally leads to ID.
>  
>   Second, my use of the expression "reflected essence" was an
instance of  speaking loosely.  My point, in the discussion of
essence, was  only that reflected being is a concept that Hegel sees
everywhere at  work in the sciences, such that your criticism of
evolution as being an  external point of view is misguided, as what
science seeks to discover  is precisely essence.  Hegel is quite
clear about this in his  discussion of scientific laws.  However, I
would agree that there  is a case to be made from the Hegelian
standpoint, science often fails  in this endeavor (which can been
particularly in his discussion of the  difference between formal,
real, and complete ground).  Another  relevant place to look for a
critique of scientific thinking would be  in Hegel's discussion of
observing reason in the Phenomenology,  especially paragraphs 254-
255 and paragraphs 304-306, where Hegel  criticizes the scientific
practice of trying to determine *laws*  relating the organism to its
>  environment.  I would suggest that  Hegel's criticism of this
practice is particularly apropos in the case  of evolutionary
psychology and certain forms of sociology.  What  Hegel is here
criticizing is the manner in which such a practice  ignores the
internal teleology of the organism as it relates to its 
environment; something that both evolutionary theory and sociology
have  begun to acknowledge with autopoietic theory and its emphasis
on the  internal organization of the organism in processing
information.   That is, autopoietic theory can be thought as an
encounter with the  contradiction internal to mechanical notions of
evolution which only  see chance at work, by virtue of how it
strives to see the organism  evolving internally as a result of its
own organization in relation to  chance.  Put otherwise, it is not
simply a function of the  external, but of the internal organization
as well.
>  
>   Third, if I've understood you correctly-- I'm not sure I have --
I am  not adverse to the remarks you make about teleology below.  
However, I don't think that the conception of teleogy you present
are  the same as those being offered by IDers.  ID theorists are
not  offering a notion of internal teleology and immanent design,
but are  making an appeal to a transcendent designer and an
external  teleology.  Hegel, quite clearly, rejects both of these 
notions.  Thus, in an addition to the Shorter Logic, Hegel writes, 
>  
>   "When people speak of 'purpose' they usually have only external 
purposiveness in mind.  From this point of view things are held  not
to bear their determination within themselves, but to count merely 
as *means*, which are used and used up in the realization of a
purpose  that lies outsidee them.  This is the general viewpoint of 
*utility*, which once played a great role, even in the sciences,
but  soon fell into *deserved* discredit, and was [re]ecognized as
a  viewpoint that does not suffice to genuine insight into the
nature of  things.  Certainly finite things as such must be given
their due  by being regarded as not ultimate and as pointing beyond 
themselves.  But this negativity of finite things is their own 
dialectic, and if we are to [re]cognize this, we must involve
ourselves  first of all in their positive content.  However, since
in the  teleogical apporach we also have to deal with the well-
intentioned  concern to demonstrate the wisdom of God, as it
specifically
>  announces  itself in nature, it must be remarked that, in all
this searching out  of the purposes for which things serve as means,
we do not get beyond  the finite, and we can very easily end up in
lame reflections; for  example, when it is not only the vine that is
considered under the  aspect of the well-known utility that it has
for men, but the cork  tree, too, is considered in its relation to
the stoppers cut from its  bark in order to seal wine bottles. 
Whole books used to be  written in this spirit, and it is easy to
see that neither the true  interest of religion nor that of science
can be advanced in this  way.  External purposiveness stands
immediately before the Idea,  but what stands on the threshold like
that is often precisely what is  most unsatisfactory" (Geraets,
Suchting, and Harris translation, 282).
>  
>   My point was that ID's conception of design and your remarks
about  things being pre-planned are precisely such an instance of
external  teleology, which "ignores the negativity of things in
THEIR own  DIALECTIC" and which "ignores the positive content of
these finite  things*.  Moreover, it is not difficult to discern
that this form  of explanation is a example of "formal ground"
or "tautological  explanation", as the proposed ground offers
nothing to what is to be  grounded.  Thus when John suggests that we
find a much more  plausable explanation for speciation in claiming
that God produced  these species, the critic is quite right to point
out that this really  explains nothing but amounts to simply evoking
a pre-fabricated  explanation that covers over whatever we don't
understand.
>  
>   Finally, fourth, you rather angrily ask what gives anyone the
right to  decide who can and who cannot speak or express their
beliefs.   First, no one is preventing IDers from expressing their
beliefs and  pursuing their research, so your argument here is a bit
of a red  herring.  What is being denied is the right of IDers to
present  their beliefs in the classroom, in the absence of empirical
support for  these beliefs.  Should IDers begin providing empirical
support for  their claims, they will then be able to introduce them
into science  classes.  They have not yet satisfied this
requirement.   Second, your suggestion that everyone be able to
speak in the schools  is, I think, hypocritical.  Presumably you
would not find it  objectionable to exclude discourses such as those
expressed by Neo-Nazi  groups and the Ku Klux Klan in the schools,
yet by the principle you  evoke would logically lead to the
conclusion that these groups should  be included in the curriculum. 
That is, your
>  conception of  freedom strikes me as inadequate.  I am not trying
to suggest that  ID is like hate speech, but only to point out that
exclusion is a  common and not unjust feature of any curriculum. 
Given the  underdeveloped state of ID theory, it belongs more
appropriately to a  philosophy class or a comparative religion
class, not a science  classroom.
>  
>   Kind Regards,
>  
>   Levi
>   www.levibryant.com
 

Dear Levi,

"I continue to see the lord/bondsman dialectic as an instance where
we do not have
a reconciliation as you suggest. The reason for this is very simple,
in the
Phenomenology it is the slave that continues to develop, not the
master",

The quotes I have provided is not from my own book Mr.Levi but from
phenomenology itself and also reinforced from Philosophy of spirit.

When Hegel plainly says by dialectics the essential consciousness
pass into unessential consciousness and unessential consciousness
into essential consciousness(phenomenology-237) it is as clear as
day that there is reconciliation of these opposites and neither the
lord shrivels and atrophies away as you say nor  dialectics is only
one term generating it's own other.I fear it is not I but you are
the one who is making the mistake of being both materialistic and
mechanical view of seeing only one side but not seeing that both
generate it's own other.
Further I have shown you from philosophy of spirit This self
consciousness of the lord emerge into social life and from the
selfishness to universal consciousness this manifest on the
phenomenal side as force(434).Further if you read philosophy of
right you can see the commencement of property which is the
beginning of objective spirit comes from this lord.As Hegel explain
there the basis of property is this lord mentality of self
acquisition and is nothing but the further expansion of the self
over things.This is the basis of social and political life.

"The
mistake you are making is to conceive dialectic mechanically as an
opposition
between two terms that are already present-at-hand, rather than as a
movement
whereby one term generates its own other. For instance, in the
opening move of
the Logic we do not first have being and nothing, rather we have
being
intrinsically or necessarily leading to the concept of nothing."


Here also the mistake is not mine,but yours.further you not only
conceiving mechanically but also materialistically.

It is not being leading to nothing but it is the implicit notion
which is leading to both being and nothing.The basic feature of
Hegel's philosophy is it is not life less being or contingency which
developing into the categories but the implicit Notion.Being is not
important but it is impotent it is only a form of notion as implicit
notion.Marx is atleast honest to leave Hegel as he is even with his
dialectical materialism of putting Hegel on his head. but the modern
materialists and evolutionists are worse ,they are I said in earlier
post putting Hegel himself upside down by making Being intrinsically
or necessarily leading to nothing,then to contingency then to life
then to notion there by to prove that life develops from
being,contingency etc and hence according to Hegel matter is prior
to mind.

here some relevant quotes from only science of logic.

The indispensable foundation, the notion, the universal which is the
thought itself, in so far as one can make abstraction from the
general idea expressed by the word 'thought', cannot be regarded as
only an indifferent form attached to a content. But these thoughts
of everything natural and spiritual, even the substantial content,
still contain a variety of determinatenesses and are still charged
with the difference of a soul and a body, of the notion and a
relative reality; the profounder basis is the soul itself, the pure
Notion which is the very heart of things, their simple life-pulse,
even of subjective thinking of them. -23

As science, truth is pure self-consciousness in its self-development
and has the shape of the self, so that the absolute truth of being
is the known Notion and the Notion as such is the absolute truth of
being.-52

All that is necessary to achieve scientific progress - and it is
essential to strive to gain this quite simple insight - is the
recognition of the logical principle that the negative is just as
much positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not resolve
itself into a nullity, into abstract nothingness, but essentially
only into the negation of its particular content, in other words,
that such a negation is not all and every negation but the negation
of a specific subject matter which resolves itself, and consequently
is a specific negation, and therefore the result essentially
contains that from which it results; which strictly speaking is a
tautology, for otherwise it would be an immediacy, not a result.
Because the result, the negation, is a specific negation, it has
content. It is a fresh Notion but higher and richer than its
predecessor; for it is richer by the negation or opposite of the
latter, therefore contains it, but also something more, and is the
unity of itself and its opposite. It is in this way that the system
of Notions as such has to be formed - and has to complete itself in
a purely continuous course in which nothing extraneous is
introduced.-62

That which enables the Notion to advance itself is the already
mentioned negative which it possesses within itself; it is this
which constitutes the genuine dialectical moment. -67

 In the philosophical treatment of classification or division, the
Notion itself must show that it is itself the course of those
determinations-76

In accordance with that result logic was defined as the science of
pure thought, the principle of which is pure knowing, the unity
which is not abstract but a living, concrete unity in virtue of the
fact that in it the opposition in consciousness between a self-
determined entity, a subject, and a second such entity, an object,
is known to be overcome; being is known to be the pure Notion in its
own self, and the pure Notion to be the true being. These, then, are
the two moments contained in logic. But now they are known to be
inseparable, not as in consciousness where each also has a separate
being of its own; it is solely because they are at the same time
known as distinct (yet not with an independent being) that their
unity is not abstract, dead and inert, but concrete.-77

Thus what is to be considered is the whole Notion, firstly as the
Notion in the form of being, secondly, as the Notion; in the first
case, the Notion is only in itself, the Notion of reality or being;
in the second case, it is the Notion as such, the Notion existing
for itself (as it is, to name concrete forms, in thinking man, and
even in the sentient animal and in organic individuality generally,
although, of course, in these it is not conscious, still less known;
it is only in inorganic nature that it is in itself). Accordingly,
logic should be divided primarily into the logic of the Notion as
being and of the Notion as Notion - or, by employing the usual terms
(although these as least definite are most ambiguous)
into 'objective' and 'subjective' logic.-79


So what is crystal clear from all this Hegel Quotes is Being is
insignificant.It is only a form of notion .it is not being which
develops into nothing but both being and nothing develops from notion

The rest of your post need no comment. As you say for my ''a sort
word salad'' you responded by reflected essence and essence of life
expression were only speaking loosely-further adapting my corrected
term   'reflected being' all along.,and also 'when you understood me
better you are not adverse to my ideas,  "However,
I would agree that there is a case to be made from the Hegelian
standpoint" etc

kind regards

lathief
 

Dear Levi,

Your understanding of Hegel that only one term develops into it's
other(slave develops,but lord shrivels)and also reinforcing this
thesis with Being and Nothing (being develops into nothing,but not
nothing into being)need some more shedding of light on this basic
feature of Hegel's philosophy.I have already in my previous post
shown that Being is not all important in Hegel's philosophy as these
materialists and evolutionist think but it is really IMPOTENT and it
is the implicit notion which develops into not only being and
nothing but to all the categories of logic.

Further you are completely missing the most important category in
Hegel,Becoming.As Hegel in encyclopedia says this becoming is so
important a category because not only life is a higher form of
becoming,but notion itself is the highest form of becoming..

"Even Becoming however, taken at its best on its own ground, is an
extremely poor term: it needs to grow in depth and weight of
meaning.
Such deepened force we find e.g. in Life. Life is a Becoming but
that is not
enough to exhaust the notion of life. A still higher form is found
in Mind.
Here too is Becoming, but richer and more intensive than mere
logical
Becoming. The elements whose unity constitute mind are not the bare
abstracts of Being and Nought, but the system of the logical Idea
and of
Nature".(lesserlogic-becomoing)

Now if any one read the first portion of science of logic or lesser
logic he will understand that this becoming is nothing but being and
nothing.There is no becoming possible with your thesis that being
passing into nothing without the antithesis of nothing passing into
being.This most important category Becoming is the reconciliation of
both terms generating it's own other.So the development of this
becoming is only possibly by not only as you say being passing into
nothing but the antithesis of nothing passing into being.

So you can easily see that what you provided to prove the one
sideness of lord -slave dialectics (Lord shrivels away as
insignificant-like that Nothing as insignificant) is contrary to
Hegel's philosophy.Of course materialists will have great advantage
to prove that everything comes out or develop from Being.But that is
as  I said putting Hegel upside down.

Here is one important quote for your reflection.

"It would not be difficult to demonstrate this unity of being and
nothing in every example, in every actual thing or thought. The same
must be said of being and nothing, as was said above about immediacy
and mediation (which latter contains a reference to an other, and
hence to negation), that nowhere in heaven or on earth is there
anything which does not contain within itself both being and
nothing. Of course, since we are speaking here of a particular
actual something, those determinations are no longer present in it
in the complete untruth in which they are as being and nothing; they
are in a more developed determination, and are grasped, for example,
as positive and negative, the former being posited, reflected being,
the latter posited, reflected nothing; the positive contains as its
abstract basis being, and the negative, nothing."(SL-138)

Kind regards

lathief

Dear Lathief,
 
  I think you've fallen into a misunderstanding as to the precise nature  of the claim I was making.  Below you remark that I understand  Hegelian dialectic as one term developing into its other and not vice  versa, but this is *not* what I initially claimed.  Originally I  made *two* claims:  First, I criticized mechanical applications of  the dialectic where one begins with the abstract schema of  thesis-antithesis-synthesis, casts about for a thesis, then looks for  its opposite, and then determines how they might be synthesized.   I evoked Hegel's discussion of the notion of being at the beginning of  the Logic as an example of how the dialectic does *not* proceed in this  way.  Hegel does not first discuss the notion of pure immediate  being *and then* discuss the notion of pure nothing.  Rather,  Hegel demonstrates how the attempt to think the notion of pure  immediate being generates, of its own accord, the notion of nothing as  there is nothing to be thought in a concept so
 devoid of  determinations.  Likewise, the attempt to think the notion of  nothing leads us back to the thought of being.  Please note,  nothing I've said here suggests that I'm confusing the *notion* of  being with *a* being (as you've incorrectly suggested in previous  posts) or ignores that this moment develops into becoming or any of the  other categories.  I was trying to illustrate a point about how  Hegel's dialectic moves by citing an example from the Logic.  I  was not trying to reduce everything to the category of being.   What I was trying to suggest is that the attempt to think the  relationship between evolution and ID according to the  thesis/antithesis schema is abstract (in Hegel's sense) insofar as it  doesn't show the one position *immanently* arising out of the other,  but only *externally reflects* on the relationship between the two,  opposing an artificial outside schema that doesn't arise from the  subject matter itself.
 
  Second, and with regard to the lord/bondsman moment of the  Phenomenology, I was making the observation that the Hegelian concept  of sublation is one where we do occasionally see determinations of one  side disappearing.  I base this especially on paragrraphs  192-195.  In 192 Hegel remarks that the Lord depends on the  bondsman for self-consciousness and fails to fully realize his  independence.  This leads Hegel to the conclusion, in 193, that  the *truth* of independent self-consciousness is to be found in the  bondsman, not the lord, insofar as the bondsman overcomes his  self-identification and self-interest, and discovers absolute  negativity or what Hegel describes as the disinterested,  all-embracingness of self-consciousness (194).  Finally, in 195,  Hegel observes that the bondsman has the advantage of preserving the  object of his labor and making the world in his own image, whereas the  lord's dealing with the object are merely a vanishing enjoyment. 
 
  As Hegel puts it, "In the moment which corresponds to desire in the  lord's consciousness, it did seem that the aspect of unessential  relation to the thing fell to the lot of the bondsman, since in that  relation the thing retained its independence.  Desire has reserved  to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby its unalloyed  feeling of self.  But that is the reason why this satisfaction is  itself only a fleeting one, for it lacks the side of objectivity and  permanence.  Work, on the other hand, is desire held in check,  fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the  thing.  The negative relation to the object becomes its *form* and  something *permanent*, because it is precisely for the worker that the  object has independence" (paragraph 195, pg. 118).
 
  In the case of the lord the object is negated through his enjoyment of  the object, and therefore the lord fails to discover the permanence of  his spirit in the world through his works.  Now, perhaps my choice  of words in suggesting that the lord shrivels was poor, but my point  was that Hegel claims that it is the bondsman that is the *truth* of  this moment in the dialectic, not the lord.  "The truth of the  independent consciousness is accordingly the servile consciousness of  the bondsman.  This, it is true, appears at first outside of  itself and not as the truth of self-consciousness.  But just as  lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it  wants to be, so too is servitude in its consummation will really turn  into the opposite of what it immediately is; as a consciousness forced  back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be transformed into  a fully independent consciousness" (paragraph 193, pg 117).  It is  thus Hegel, not I who makes
 the claim that it is the bondsman that  continues to develop through his work.  Why does Hegel deny that  this takes place with the lord?  Precisely because the lord only  enjoys (negates) the object, whereas the bondsman works the object over  through his labor and gives it the form of his spirit and also  discovers his own status as independent self-consciousness through his  fear of death embodied in the lord.
 
  The point I was trying to make by referring to this example of the  lord/bondsman dialectic, is that there are moments in Hegel's dialectic  where one side of the opposition does not continue to develop.  I  could have just as easily evoked Hegel's discussion of phrenology or  his discussion of the Reign of Terror, but I suspected that the example  of the lord/bondsman would be more familiar.  In this particular  moment, the lord is a necessary condition for the bondsman discovering  his self-consciousness-- it would encounter without the encounter with  the lord --but it is not the case that the lord develops in this  way.  This allows for an alternative way of understanding the  debate between evolution and ID, where it is not a question of  reconciling the two in a harmonious unity, but where the encounter of  science with ID is a question not of embracing the theological  proclivities of ID, but of discovering something internal to science or  evolutionary theory itself, much
 as the slave discovers his own staus  as independent self-consciousness through his fear of the lord and  labor for the lords satisfaction.
 
  You've referred to me as a materialist a few times now, and I'm not  sure how you're arriving at this conclusion.  The fact that I  reject ID as bad science does not lead to the conclusion that I'm  necessarily a materialist, nor do the claims I've so far made indicate  that I'm somehow giving a materialist reading of Hegel's Logic (which  would be absurd).  Like Don Quixote, I get the sense that you  might be tilting at windmills thinking them dragons when you call me a  materialist...  That is, you're attributing claims to me that I  haven't made.
 
  Kind Regards,
 
  Levi
  www.levibryant.com

Dear Levi,

It is good hear that all these posts made you confess that you are
not a materialist,but an idealist evolutionist!!.

All your explanation about lord-slave dialectics shows you are still
not reflecting a little to under stand that property,social life etc
which manifest as force in the world develops from the lord.Not only
lord there is no category in hegel's system which is not becoming a
moment in the higher category.I hope you will realise it when you
under stand hegel and stops this shrivelling away of Lord.

>" You suggest that evolutionary theory's reference to chance  and
>randomness demonstrates that it only reflects life externally, yet 
>Hegel is quite clear that the realm of nature (to which discussion
>of  organic life
> belongs) refers to contingency (i.e., that which makes  reference
>to something other than itself) and emerges out of  contingency."

Now I am being Quixotic.Like the above quote(by the way it is not
life that is cotingent but finite appearence) your attempt to
develop everything from being,contingency etc will reveal every
thing to intelligent members from your post themselves.
Kind regards
lathief

Dear Mr. Lathief,
 
  It is quickly becoming clear that there are diminishing returns in  continuing discussion with you, as your manner of reading my posts  indicates a predominance of abstract understanding a lack of  charity.  Thus, for example, you take my reference to the opening  move of the Logic and conclude that I am reducing everything to the  initial category of being, rather than making an observation of how  Hegel's logic develops.  In my discussion of the lord/bondsman  relation, you suggest I am claiming that the lord doesn't play a  necessary role in the development of subsequent stages, rather than  pointing out that the lord, according to Hegel's own word, does not  himself develop as a result of remaining fast in enjoyment, rathering  than encountering fear of death and laboring upon objects.  Now  you suggest that I am claiming that everything emerges from contigency,  when my remark very specifically claimed that nature-- not everything  --is the domain of contingency.  If you care
 to refer to the  science of Logic, you will find that Hegel's very first remark is that:
 
  "Nature has presented itself as the idea in the form of otherness.     Since in nature the idea is as the negative of itself or is external to  itself nature is not merely external in relation to this idea, but the  externality constitutes the determination in which nature as nature  exists"  (paragraph 192).
 
  Now, Mr. Lathief, ask yourself what the negative of the Idea is or  what the Idea is in its otherness?  The otherness or negation of  the idea is necessity that has not yet manifested itself or posited  itself.  What is contingency?  Perhaps an example would best  illustrate contingency.  It is merely the fact that there is no  *necessary* reason that so many billions of people exist on the planet  at this particular point in time, or that two people happen to meet at  a particular time, or that my fingernail has precisely this white spot  in this particular place.  That is, contingency refers to that  which can't be deduced purely from a concept (which isn't to say that  it can't be accounted for through causes).  This Hegelian  conception of nature is confirmed in the next paragraph when Hegel  remarks that,
 
  "In this externality the determinations of the concept have the  appearance of an indifferent subsistence and isolation in regards to  each other. The concept therefore exists as an inward entity. Hence  nature exhibits no freedom in its existence, but only necessity and  contingency" (paragraph 193).
 
  That which is indifferent and external is precisely that which  cannot be deduced according to necessity.  For instance, I could  not deduce *your* existence from the concept of humanity.  Now,  apparently I have to say everything lest you attribute claims to me  that I'm not making.  Am I suggesting that the dialectic does not  move beyond the contingency found in nature and indifferent  externality?  Absolutely not.  The whole point of the  Encyclopedia Philosophy of Nature is to show that there is a dialectic  internal to nature that necessarily leads to free spirit.   However, my original point was simply that the organic life studied by  biology belongs to Encyclopedia Philosophy of Nature, and is therefore  charactrized by contingency or a form of explanation that isn't  amenable to dialectical investigation (rather, we here have to employ  observational reason and an inquiry into causes, as Randell rightly  pointed out).  Once again, does this mean that contingency is all
 that there is?  No, absolutely not.  Nature develops into  spirit.  However, we must be careful not to place  self-determining, self-conscious, self-positing, free spirit where it  is not.
 
  Regards,
 
  Levi
  www.levibryant.com
  
   Dear Levi,

Below is some quotes from 'system of Ethical Life'. May be it will
be of help for those who have only scanned Phenomenology and also to
understand the reconcillation of the opposites of Lord and slave.

"(ii) This formal, relationless, recognition, presented in relation
and difference or according to the concept.

At this level a living individual confronts a living individual, but
their power (Potenz) of life is unequal. Thus one is might or power
over the other. One is indifference, while the other is fixed in
difference. So the former is related to the latter as cause;
indifferent itself, it is the latter's life and soul or spirit. The
greater strength or weakness is nothing but the fact that one of
them is caught up in difference, fixed and determined in some way in
which the other is not, but is free. The indifference of the one not
free is his inner being, his formal aspect, not something that has
become explicit and that annihilates his difference. Yet this
indifference must be there for him; it is his concealed inner life
and on this account he intuits it as its opposite, namely, as
something external, and the identity is a relative one, not an
absolute one or a reconciliation of internal and external. This
relation in which the indifferent and free has power over the
different is the relation of lordship and bondage [or master and
servant].

This relation is immediately and absolutely established along with
the inequality of the power of life. At this point there is no
question of any right or any necessary equality. Equality is nothing
but an abstraction - it is the formal thought of life, of the first
level, and this thought is purely ideal and without reality. In
reality, on the other hand, it is the inequality of life which is
established, and therefore the relation of lordship and bondage. For
in reality what we have is shape and individuality and appearance,
and consequently difference of power (Potenz) and might, or the
relative identity where one individual is posited as indifferent and
the other as different. Here plurality is the plurality of
individuals, for, in the first level, absolute singularity has been
posited in the formality of life, posited as the form of the inner
life, since life is the form of external identity or absence of
difference. And where there is a plurality of individuals, there is
a relation between them, and this relation is lordship and bondage.
Lordship and bondage is immediately the very concept of the
plurality relation. There is no need for transition or conclusion
here, as if some further ground or reason were still to be exhibited
for it.

Lordship and bondage are therefore natural, because individuals
confront one another in this relation; but the relation of lordship
and obedience is also set up whenever individuals as such enter into
a moral relation in connection with what is most ethical, and it is
a question of the formation of the ethical order as framed by the
highest individuality of genius and talent. Formally this moral
relation is the same as the natural one; the difference consists in
the fact that in ethical lordship and obedience the power or might
is at the same time something absolutely universal, whereas here it
is only something particular; in ethical lordship individuality is
only something external and the form; here it is the essence of the
relation and on this account there is here a relation of bondage,
since bondage is obedience to the single individual and the
particular.

The master [or overlord] is the indifference of the specific
characteristics, but purely as a person or as a formally living
being. He is also subject or cause [as opposed to object or
instrument]. Indifference [or identity] is subsumed under "being the
subject" or under the concept; and the bondsman is related to him as
to formal indifference or the person. Because the commander is here
qua person, it follows that the absolute, the Idea, the identity of
the two is not what is posited in the master in the form of
indifference and in the servant in the form of difference; on the
contrary, the link between the two is particularity in general, and,
in practice, need. The master is in possession of a surplus, of what
is physically necessary; the servant lacks it, and indeed in such a
way that the surplus and the lack of it are not single [accidental]
aspects but the indifference of necessary needs.

(iii) This relation of bondage or of person to person, of formal
life to formal life, where one is under the form of indifference and
the other under that of difference, must be undifferentiated or
subsumed under the first level, so that the same relation between
persons, the dependence of one on the other, remains, but that the
identity is an absolute one yet inner, not explicit, and the
relation of difference is only the external form. But the identity
must necessarily remain an inner one, because at this whole level it
is either only a formal one (legal right) hovering over the
particular and opposed to it, or an inner one, i.e., one subsumed
under individuality as such, under the intuition of particularity,
and so appears as nature, not as an identity subjugating a pair of
antitheses or as ethical nature in which that antithetic pair has
been likewise superseded, but in such a way that particularity and
individuality are what has been subsumed.

This indifference of the lordship and bondage relation, an identity
in which personality and the abstraction of life are absolutely one
and the same, while this relation is only something qua apparent and
external, is the [patriarchal] family. In it the totality of nature
and all the foregoing are united; the entire foregoing particularity
is transformed in the family into the universal. The family is the
identity:

(a) of external needs

(b) of sex-relationship, the natural difference posited in the
individuals themselves, and

(g) of the relation of parents to children or of natural reason, of
reason emergent, but existing as nature.

(a) On account of the absolute and natural oneness of the husband,
the wife, and the child, where there is no antithesis of person to
person or of subject to object, the surplus is not the property of
one of them, since their indifference is not a formal or a legal
one. So too all contracts regarding property or service and the like
fall away here because these things are grounded in the
presupposition of private personality. Instead the surplus, labour,
and property are absolutely common to all, inherently and
explicitly; and on the death of one of them there is no transfer
from him to a stranger; all that happens is that the deceased's
participation in the common property ends.

Difference is [i.e., it has here] the superficial aspect of
lordship. The husband is master and manager, but not a property
owner as against the other members of the family. As manager he has
only the appearance of free disposal of the family property. Labour
too is divided according to the nature of each member of the family,
but its product is common property. Precisely because of this
division each member produces a surplus, but not as his own
property. The transfer of the surplus is not an exchange, because
the whole property is directly, inherently, and explicitly common.

(b) The sex relation between husband and wife is naturally
undifferentiated. I have said in (a) that in respect of personality,
i.e., as holders of property, they are definitely one. But the sex
relation gives a special form to their indifference, for it is
something inherently particular. When the particular as such is made
into a universal or the concept, it can only become something
empirically universal. (In religion things are different.)
Particularity becomes persistent, enduring, and fixed. The sex
relation is restricted entirely to these two individuals together,
and it is established permanently as marriage."

Dear Mr. Levi,
 
Indeed you have come a long way.From your first post where the lord
 atrophies and shrivels away
 
> >it's
> > > > notable that not all oppositions are reconciled in Hegel's
> > > thought.
> > > > Perhaps the prime example of this is the dialectic between
> the
> > > lord
> > > > and bondsman, where the bondsman goes on to discover his
> > > freedom,
> > > > whereas the lord atrophies and shrivels away
>
 
to your last post
 
> >In my discussion of the
> >lord/bondsman relation, you suggest I am claiming that the lord
> doesn't play a
> >necessary role in the development of subsequent stages, rather
than
> pointing
> >out that the lord, according to Hegel's own word, does not
himself
> develop as a
> >result of remaining fast in enjoyment, rathering than
encountering
> fear of
> >death and laboring upon objects.
 
 
where lord has a nesessry role in the development of subsequent
 stages but does not himself develop.
 
 I hope my quotes from System of ethical life like
 
 
"Lordship and bondage are therefore natural, because individuals
 confront one another in this relation; but the relation of lordship
 and obedience is also set up whenever individuals as such enter
into
 a moral relation in connection with what is most ethical, and it is
 a question of the formation of the ethical order as framed by the
 highest individuality of genius and talent. Formally this moral
 relation is the same as the natural one; the difference consists in
 the fact that in ethical lordship and obedience the power or might
 is at the same time something absolutely universal, whereas here it
 is only something particular; in ethical lordship individuality is
 only something external and the form; here it is the essence of the
 relation and on this account there is here a relation of bondage,
 since bondage is obedience to the single individual and the
 particular"
 
 make you understand Lord does develop in the higher form of genius
 and talent where this power and might itself becomes universal.
 
 Now about being and contingency.

 As may know the fundamental base of everything in Hegel's
philosophy
 is Absolute Idea.As Hegel explains in Science of logic and other
 books and also when commenting on Kant,'s criticism of the
 ontological proof this Absolute idea is the unity of Notion and
 Being.This being is the 'other' (and  as you wrote the other of
 the idea is not necessity or contingency-they are only a minor form
 of this being in the plane of essence as reflected being).
So this other is there in the Absoluteidea itself.
 Now what happens in the beginning is the idea withdraws into the
 unity of being or to it's other.This is the idea or notion in the
form
 of being.Now in the first categories of being,nothing and becoming
 ( thesis-antithesis and synthesis) as notion is in the form of 
pure
 being here the other is nothing.(this is why Hegel criticizes both
 Parmenides &Spinoza because of the former's stand of only "being
 is ,nothing not" and the latter's Absolute substance- so both
incapable
 of developing nothing or finite out of being).Now becoming contains
 not only being and nothing as moments but as synthesis it is a
 higher category.Now this process is happening in all the
 categories.
For brevity and easy comprehension I will explain the
 major categories.In being quality is being implicit(thesis) but
 quantity-as external to being is the other and measure is the
reconciliation. when we
 comes to Essence the same quality as being reflected is the ground
 of existence-the same quantity as the other is the Appearance
(external) in the
 plane of essence.and Actuality is the Measure in the plane of
 essence. when we come to notion Subjective notion is this Existence
 in the pane of notion and object is the Appearance in notional
plane
 and idea is the Actuality as notion.
 
 So the basic thing to understand about Hegel philosophy is the
 content of all categories is the Absolute idea and only the forms
 are different.So as I explained by every thesis,antithesis and
 synthesis the same content develops into higher and higher forms.
 
Now take the major three categories.Being.Essence and Notion.As I
 explained the content of all the three is Absolute idea but the
 forms are different.First it is-NOTION OR THOUGH in the form of
being,then in the
 form of essence then as Notion culminating as Absolute Idea.Now
when
in this forms of thesis ,antithesis and synthesis Being or Thesis is
 implicit idea in immediacy,essence as the negative or other.This is
 why Hegel say the thesis and synthesis denotesthe realm of infinite
 but antithesis (essence)finite.This is the realm of reflected
 being.passed beyond being but not reached notion-so the reflective
 understanding will always see opposition between being and
notion.It
 sees being as the inessential,external ,finite and the notion as
 internal,infinite and essential.Now what you say contingency,nature
 finititude all are your reflective understanding in the  plane of
 essence where there is opposition between finite and infinite
 contingent and permanent ,identity and difference etc.
 
 So the basic problem is you are discussing all this from the stand
 point of reflective understanding where these opposites are  still
 not reconciled.When you think speculatively you will realize that
 the other is nothing but spirit itself only in the form of
 otherness,it's own other.It is true that the subject can still
 abstract(negate) everything from his subjectivity but as the other
 is also its own self or it's own other the contingency and finitude
 exist only in form not in content which is the infinite thought in
these forms.
 regards
 lathief